Lecture 8

Applications of consumer theory

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1 The Work-Leisure Decision

The setup

- There are only two goods: consumption goods C and time.
- Barter economy: consumer exchanges work time for consumption good.
 - Price of consumption is 1.
 - One hour of work is worth w units of consumption.
- Consumer is endowed with h hours, to be used in:

leisure: l = time used at home

work: N^s = time exchanged in the market (labor time)

• The time constraint for the consumer is then

$$l + N^s = h$$

which states that leisure time plus time spent working must sum to total time available.

The consumer's real disposable income


- For his work, consumer gets $wN^s = w(h-l)$ units of consumption good.
- Consumer also receives π units of consumption good, in the form of real dividend income.
- \bullet Consumer must pay a lump-sum tax amount T to the government.
- Therefore, the budget constraint is


$$C = w(h-l) + \pi - T$$

• which can also be written as

$$C + wl = wh + \pi - T$$

The budget constraint






The consumer's preferences

The representative consumer's preferences are defined by

with $U(\cdot,\cdot)$ a function that is:

- increasing in both arguments,
- strictly quasiconcave, and
- twice differentiable.



The consumer's problem

• The consumer's optimization problem is to choose C and l so as to maximize U(C, l) subject to his or her budget constraint—that is,

$$\max_{C,l} U(C,l) \qquad \text{s.t. } \begin{cases} C = w(h-l) + \pi - T \\ l \le h \end{cases}$$

• This problem is a constrained optimization problem, with the associated Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L} = U(C, l) + \lambda [w(h-l) + \pi - T - C] + \mu (h-l)$$

where λ and μ are the Lagrange multipliers.

Solving the problem

- We assume that there is an interior solution to the consumer's problem where C>0 and 0< l.
- This can be guaranteed by assuming that

$$U_C(0,l) = \infty$$
 and $U_l(C,0) = \infty$

• The first-order conditions are

$$U_C(C,l) - \lambda = 0$$

$$U_l(C,l) - \lambda w - \mu = 0$$

$$w(h-l) + \pi - T - C = 0.$$

• Slackness conditions:

$$\mu \ge 0$$
 $h-l \ge 0$ $\mu(h-l) = 0$


Case 1: l = h (consumer does not work!)

- For this case to be feasible, we require that $C = \pi T > 0$.
- From the first two FOCs and nonnegativity of multiplier:

$$U_l(\pi - T, h) - wU_C(\pi - T, h) = \mu \ge 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow w \le \frac{U_l(\pi - T, h)}{U_C(\pi - T, h)}$$

- Thus, consumer does not work if he has $\pi T > 0$, and at bundle $(\pi T, h)$ the market wage rate is less than his MRS of leisure for consumption.
- In a competitive equilibrium we cannot have l=h, as this would imply that nothing would be produced and C=0.




Case 2: $\mu = 0$ (consumer goes to work!)

• From the first two FOCs:

$$U_l(C^*, l^*) = wU_C(C^*, l^*)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow w = \frac{U_l(C^*, l^*)}{U_C(C^*, l^*)}$$

- Thus, consumer works $N^{s^*} = h l^*$ hours and consumes $C^* = w(h l^*) + \pi T$.
- At this allocation, his MRS of leisure for consumption equals the market wage rate.



A parametric example

 $U(C, l) = \ln(c) + \gamma \ln(l)$

• FOC

$$MRS_{lC} = \frac{U_l}{U_C} = \frac{\frac{\gamma}{l}}{\frac{1}{C}} = \frac{\gamma C}{l} = w$$

• Time and budget constraints:

$$w = \frac{\gamma C}{h - N^s}$$


$$C = wN^s + \pi - T$$

• Then

$$N^{s*} = \frac{wh - \gamma(\pi - T)}{(1 + \gamma)w}$$

Real Dividends or Taxes Change for the Consumer


- Assume that consumption and leisure are both normal goods.
- An increase in dividends or a decrease in taxes will then cause the consumer to increase consumption and reduce the quantity of labor supplied (increase leisure).



An Increase in the Market Real Wage Rate

- This has income and substitution effects.
- Substitution effect: the price of leisure rises, so the consumer substitutes from leisure to consumption.
- *Income effect:* the consumer is effectively more wealthy and, since both goods are normal, consumption increases and leisure increases.
- Conclusion: Consumption must rise, but leisure may rise or fall.

Increase in the Real Wage Rate-Income and Substitution Effects




The labor supply function

- Suppose l(w) is a function that tells us how much leisure the consumer wishes to consume, given the real wage w.
- Then, the labor supply curve is given by

$$N^s(w) = h - l(w)$$

The slope of the labor supply function


- We do not know whether labor supply is increasing or decreasing in the real wage, because the effect of a wage increase on the consumer's leisure choice is ambiguous.
- Assuming that the substitution effect is larger than the income effect of a change in the real wage, labor supply increases with an increase in the real wage, and the labor supply schedule is upward-sloping.



Employment, N

Labor supply response to an increase in dividend

• An increase in nonwage disposable income shifts the labor supply curve to the left, that is, from N^s to N_1^s , because leisure is a normal good



Employment, N

1.1 Comparative statics in leisure-consumption model

The economist's problem

- You have a model with n endogenous variables \mathbf{y} and m exogenous variables \mathbf{x} , whose solution is described by $\mathbf{y} = \Psi(\mathbf{x})$.
- You have found n model conditions of the form $g(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 0$.
- Problem: How to analyze the comparative statics of the model without an explicit formula for $\Psi(\mathbf{x})$?
- Solution: compute the total derivative of g, using the chain rule.

Side note: The gradient and the Hessian matrix Let f be a function, $f: \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$, where $\mathbf{x} = (x_1 \cdots x_n)'$. We denote the first partial derivatives of $f(\mathbf{x})$ by

$$f_i(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_i}$$
 and $\nabla f(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{pmatrix} f_1(\mathbf{x}) \\ \vdots \\ f_n(\mathbf{x}) \end{pmatrix}$

and the Hessian matrix of $f(\mathbf{x})$ by

$$H(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} f_{11}(\mathbf{x}) & f_{12}(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_{1n}(\mathbf{x}) \\ f_{21}(\mathbf{x}) & f_{22}(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_{2n}(\mathbf{x}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ f_{n1}(\mathbf{x}) & f_{n2}(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_{nn}(\mathbf{x}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Side note: The Jacobian Let f be a function, $f: \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^m$:

$$f(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} f^1(\mathbf{x}) \\ \vdots \\ f^m(\mathbf{x}) \end{bmatrix}$$

We denote the Jacobian of $f(\mathbf{x})$ by

$$J(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} f_1^1(\mathbf{x}) & f_2^1(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_n^1(\mathbf{x}) \\ f_1^2(\mathbf{x}) & f_2^2(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_n^2(\mathbf{x}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ f_1^m(\mathbf{x}) & f_2^m(\mathbf{x}) & \dots & f_n^m(\mathbf{x}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \nabla f^1(\mathbf{x})' \\ \nabla f^2(\mathbf{x})' \\ \vdots \\ \nabla f^m(\mathbf{x})' \end{bmatrix}$$

Side note: A partitioned Jacobian

- Let $g(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ be a function of vectors $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, such that $g: \mathbb{R}^{n+m} \to \mathbb{R}^n$.
- Think of g as a system of n nonlinear equations on n endogenous variables \mathbf{y} and m exogenous variables \mathbf{x} .
- The partial Jacobians Dg_y and Dg_x form a partition of the Jacobian:

$$J(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = [Dg_y \mid Dg_x] = \begin{bmatrix} g_{y_1}^1 & g_{y_2}^1 & \dots & g_{y_n}^1 & g_{x_1}^1 & g_{x_2}^1 & \dots & g_{x_m}^1 \\ g_{y_1}^2 & g_{y_2}^2 & \dots & g_{y_n}^2 & g_{x_1}^2 & g_{x_2}^2 & \dots & g_{x_m}^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ g_{y_1}^n & g_{y_2}^n & \dots & g_{y_n}^n & g_{x_1}^n & g_{x_2}^n & \dots & g_{x_m}^n \end{bmatrix}$$

Side note: The total derivative

• The total derivative of $g(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ satisfies

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial g^{k}}{\partial y_{i}} dy_{i} + \sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{\partial g^{k}}{\partial x_{i}} dx_{i} = 0, \quad \forall k = 1, \dots, n$$

• This can be written in terms of the partitioned Jacobian:

$$0 = \begin{bmatrix} g_{y_1}^1 & g_{y_2}^1 & \dots & g_{y_n}^1 \\ g_{y_1}^2 & g_{y_2}^2 & \dots & g_{y_n}^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ g_{y_1}^n & g_{y_2}^n & \dots & g_{y_n}^n \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dy_1 \\ dy_2 \\ \vdots \\ dy_n \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} g_{x_1}^1 & g_{x_2}^1 & \dots & g_{x_m}^1 \\ g_{x_2}^2 & g_{x_2}^2 & \dots & g_{x_m}^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ g_{x_1}^n & g_{x_2}^n & \dots & g_{x_m}^n \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dx_1 \\ dx_2 \\ \vdots \\ dx_m \end{bmatrix}$$

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$$= Dg_y \, dy + Dg_x \, dx$$

• Then $d\mathbf{y} = -[Dg_y]^{-1}Dg_x d\mathbf{x}$, assuming inverse is defined.

Comparative statics in leisure-consumption model

In our leisure-consumption model, the solution required that:

$$g_1(c, l, \mathbf{w}, \pi) = U_l - wU_c = 0$$

 $g_2(c, l, \mathbf{w}, \pi) = c - wh + wl - \pi = 0$

Therefore

$$\begin{split} 0 &= \begin{bmatrix} g_c^1 & g_l^1 \\ g_c^2 & g_l^2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathrm{d}c \\ \mathrm{d}l \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} g_w^1 & g_\pi^1 \\ g_w^2 & g_\pi^2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathrm{d}w \\ \mathrm{d}\pi \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} U_{lc} - wU_{cc} & U_{ll} - wU_{cl} \\ 1 & w \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathrm{d}c \\ \mathrm{d}l \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -U_c & 0 \\ l - h & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathrm{d}w \\ \mathrm{d}\pi \end{bmatrix} \end{split}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} dc \\ dl \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} U_{lc} - wU_{cc} & U_{ll} - wU_{cl} \\ 1 & w \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} U_c & 0 \\ h - l & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dw \\ d\pi \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \frac{1}{\nabla} \begin{bmatrix} w & wU_{cl} - U_{ll} \\ -1 & U_{lc} - wU_{cc} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} U_c & 0 \\ h - l & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dw \\ d\pi \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \frac{1}{\nabla} \begin{bmatrix} wU_c + (h - l)(wU_{cl} - U_{ll}) & wU_{cl} - U_{ll} \\ -U_c + (h - l)(U_{lc} - wU_{cc}) & U_{lc} - wU_{cc} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dw \\ d\pi \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$$\nabla = -(w^2 U_{cc} - 2w U_{cl} + U_{ll}) = -\begin{vmatrix} 0 & 1 & w \\ 1 & U_{cc} & U_{cl} \\ w & U_{lc} & U_{ll} \end{vmatrix} \ge 0$$

The comparative statics follows from:

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}c}{\mathrm{d}\pi} = \frac{wU_{cl} - U_{ll}}{\nabla} > 0 \qquad (c \text{ is normal})$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}c}{\mathrm{d}w} = \frac{wU_c + (h - l)(wU_{cl} - U_{ll})}{\nabla} > 0$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}l}{\mathrm{d}\pi} = \frac{U_{lc} - wU_{cc}}{\nabla} > 0$$
($l \text{ is normal}$)

2 Choice under uncertainty

Choice under uncertainty

 Until now, we have been concerned with the behavior of a consumer under conditions of certainty.

 $\frac{\mathrm{d}l}{\mathrm{d}w} = \frac{-U_c + (h-l)(U_{lc} - wU_{cc})}{\nabla} \quad ? \quad 0$

- However, many choices made by consumers take place under conditions of uncertainty.
- In this section we explore how the theory of consumer choice can be used to describe such behavior.

The choices

- The first question to ask is what is the basic "thing" that is being chosen?
- The consumer is presumably concerned with the probability distribution of getting different consumption bundles of goods.
- A probability distribution consists of a list of different outcomes—in this case, consumption bundles—and the probability associated with each outcome.
- When a consumer decides how much automobile insurance to buy or how much to invest in the stock market, he is in effect deciding on a pattern of probability distribution across different amounts of consumption.

Contingent consumption

- Let us think of the different outcomes of some random event as being different states of nature.
- A contingent consumption plan is a specification of what will be consumed in each different state of nature.
- Contingent means depending on something not yet certain.
- People have preferences over different plans of consumption, just like they have preferences over actual consumption.
- We can think of preferences as being defined over different consumption plans.

Utility functions and probabilities

- If the consumer has reasonable preferences about consumption in different circumstances, then we can use a utility function to describe these preferences.
- However, uncertainty does add a special structure to the choice problem.
- How a person values consumption in one state as compared to another will depend on the probability that the state in question will actually occur.
- For this reason, we will write the utility function as depending on the probabilities as well as on the consumption levels.

Utility with discrete random outcomes

• If there are n possible states of nature s, then c is a discrete random variable with support $\{c_1, \ldots, c_n\}$, whose values are realized with probabilities $\{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}$.

s	${\mathbb P}$	c	u(c)
1	π_1	c_1	$u(c_1)$
2	π_2	c_2	$u(c_1) \ u(c_2)$
÷		:	
n	π_n	c_n	$u(v_n)$

• Utility is

$$U(c_1, \dots, c_n; \pi_1, \dots, \pi_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i u(c_i)$$

Utility with continuous random outcomes

- If there are infinite states of nature, we think of c as a continuous random variable.
- If c has support C, pdf f(c) and cdf F(c), then utility is

$$U(c,f) = \int_{\mathbf{c}} f(c)u(c) dc$$

$$= \int_{\mathbf{c}} u(c) \, \mathrm{d}F(c)$$

von Neumann-Morgenstern utility

• We refer to a utility function *U* with the particular form described here as an *expected utility* function, or, sometimes, a *von Neumann-Morgenstern utility* function:

$$U(c, \mathbb{P}) \equiv \mathbb{E} u(c) = \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi_{i} u(c_{i}) & \text{discrete} \\ \int_{\mathbf{c}} u(c) \, dF(c) & \text{continuous} \end{cases}$$

• We refer to u(c) as the Bernoulli utility function.

2.1 Demand for insurance

Growing potatoes in uncertain weather

- A farmer grows potatoes for own consumption.
- The weather s can be good or bad, affecting the amount of potatoes (real income y) he actually harvests:

s (weather)	\mathbb{P}	y
g (good) b (bad)	$\pi_g \ \pi_b$	$W \ W-L$

- That is, if weather is bad, he loses L potatoes.
- Expected consumption of potatoes:

$$\mathbb{E} c = \mathbb{E} y = (1 - \pi_b)W + \pi_b(W - L) = W - \pi_b L$$

An insurance contract

- Farmer can insure K potatoes, premium is γ per unit.
- Choices are contingent consumption plans:

s	${\mathbb P}$	y	insure	c
$egin{array}{c} g \ b \end{array}$	$\pi_g \ \pi_b$	$W \ W - L$	$-\gamma K \\ (1-\gamma)K$	$W - \gamma K W - \gamma K + K - L$

Expected utility of buying insurance coverage K

• Expected utility is

$$U(c_g, c_b; \pi_g, \pi_b) \equiv \mathbb{E} u(c)$$


$$= \pi_g u(c_g) + \pi_b u(c_b)$$

$$= \pi_g u(W - \gamma K) + \pi_b u(W - \gamma K + K - L)$$

• MRS of bad-weather potatoes for one good-weather potato is

$$MRS_{bg} = \frac{U_{c_b}}{U_{c_g}} = \frac{\pi_b u'(c_b)}{\pi_g u'(c_g)}$$

Objective function: $\mathbb{E} u(c) = U(c_g, c_b, \pi_g, \pi_b) = \pi_g u(c_g) + \pi_b u(c_b)$



Budget constraint $(c_g, c_b) = (y_g - \gamma K, \ y_b + (1 - \gamma)K)$

• We have

$$K = \frac{y_g - c_g}{\gamma} = \frac{c_b - y_b}{1 - \gamma}$$

• Therefore


$$c_g + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}c_b = y_g + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}y_b$$

• Substitute $y_g = W$ and $y_b = W - L$ to get

$$c_g + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}c_b = W + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}(W - L)$$
$$= \frac{1}{1-\gamma}W - \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}L$$


• The relative price (in terms of potatoes in good weather) of a potato in bad weather is $p = \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}$ Budget constraint:

$$c_g + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}c_b = \frac{1}{1-\gamma}W - \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}L$$



 $Optimality\ condition:$

$$MRS_{bg} = \frac{\pi_b u'(c_b)}{\pi_g u'(c_g)} = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} = p$$



Demand for insurance

• Of course, we could also solve for optimal K directly:

$$\max_{K} \left\{ \pi_g u(W - \gamma K) + \pi_b u(W - L - \gamma K + K) \right\}$$

• FOC:

$$0 = -\gamma \pi_q u'(W - \gamma K) + (1 - \gamma)\pi_b u'(W - L - \gamma K + K)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\pi_b u'(W - L - \gamma K + K)}{\pi_g u'(W - \gamma K)} = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}$$


Risk of losses and price of insurance

• The market price of insurance should satisfy $\gamma \geq \pi_b$, so the insurer gets enough revenue γK to cover expected payments $\pi_b K$. This implies that:


$$\begin{split} \gamma &\geq \pi_b \\ 1 - \pi_b &\geq 1 - \gamma \\ \gamma (1 - \pi_b) &\geq \pi_b (1 - \gamma) \\ 1 &\geq \frac{\pi_b (1 - \gamma)}{\gamma (1 - \pi_b)} = \frac{u'(c_g)}{u'(c_b)} \\ u'(c_b) &\geq u'(c_g) \\ c_b &\leq c_g \end{split} \tag{from FOC}$$


• Consumer gets full insurance iif it's actuarially fair.

Case $\gamma = \pi_b$: actuarially fair insurance



Case $\gamma > \pi_b$: insurer expects a profit





Example 1: Logarithmic utility

Let's now assume that $u(c) = \ln(c)$ From the FOC:

$$\gamma \pi_g u'(W - \gamma K) = (1 - \gamma)\pi_b u'(W - L + (1 - \gamma)K)$$

$$\gamma \pi_g [W - L + (1 - \gamma)K] = (1 - \gamma)\pi_b (W - \gamma K)$$

$$\pi_g \gamma (W - L) + \pi_g \gamma (1 - \gamma)K = \pi_b (1 - \gamma)W - \pi_b \gamma (1 - \gamma)K$$

$$(\pi_b + \pi_g)(1 - \gamma)\gamma K = (\pi_b - \gamma(\pi_b + \pi_g))W + \gamma \pi_g L$$

$$\gamma (1 - \gamma)K = (\pi_b - \gamma)W + \gamma (1 - \pi_b)L$$


$$K^* = \frac{1 - \pi_b}{1 - \gamma}L - \frac{\gamma - \pi_b}{\gamma(1 - \gamma)}W$$


Optimal contingent consumption plans:

s	\mathbb{P}	y	c^*
$egin{array}{c} g \ b \end{array}$	$\pi_g \ \pi_b$	$W \ W-L$	$\frac{\frac{1-\pi_b}{1-\gamma}(W-\gamma L)}{\frac{\pi_b}{\gamma}(W-\gamma L)}$

2.2 Risk aversion


A risk averse consumer






Measuring risk aversion

- A consumer with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function can be one of the following:
 - Risk-averse, with a concave utility function;
 - Risk-neutral, with a linear utility function, or;
 - Risk-loving, with a convex utility function.
- Then, the degree of risk-aversion a consumer displays would be related to the curvature of their Bernoulli utility function u(W).
- The more "curved" a concave u(W) is, the lower will be a consumer's certainty equivalent, and the higher their risk premium.
- How do we measure the curvature of a function?
- Simple using the function's second derivative.



A change in risk aversion



2.3 A risky asset

A risky asset

- Consider a simple two-period portfolio problem involving two assets, one with a risky (gross) return $\tilde{R} \geq 0$ and one with a sure (gross) return $R_f \geq 1$.
- Let w be initial wealth, and let $x \in [0,1]$ be the share of wealth invested in the risky asset.

s	\mathbb{P}	risky	risk-free	c
$\tilde{R} = R$	f(R)	xw	(1-x)w	$[(1-x)R_f + xR]w$

• In this case the second-period wealth can be written as

$$\tilde{W} = (1 - x)R_f w + x\tilde{R}w$$
$$= [(1 - x)R_f + x\tilde{R}]w$$

• Note that \tilde{W} is a random variable since \tilde{R} is random.

Expected utility

• The expected utility from investing x in the risky asset:

$$v(x) = \mathbb{E} u(c) = \mathbb{E} u \left([(1-x)R_f + x\tilde{R}]w \right)$$

• The portfolio problem is then to choose $x \in [0,1]$ to maximize v(x):

$$\mathcal{L}(x,\mu,\lambda) = \mathbb{E} u \left([(1-x)R_f + x\tilde{R}]w \right) + \mu x + \lambda (1-x)$$

• Conditions:

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R}-R_f)w\right\} + \mu - \lambda = 0$$

$$\mu \ge 0$$
 $\qquad x \ge 0$ $\qquad \mu x = 0$ $\qquad \lambda \ge 0$ $\qquad x \le 1$ $\qquad \lambda(1-x) = 0$

Second order condition

• Notice that second derivative is

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u''(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R}-R_f)^2w^2\right\}<0 \quad \text{iif} \quad u''(\tilde{W})<0$$

• SOC requires that consumer is risk-averse.

Slackness conditions

- The slackness conditions (SC) imply:
 - if x = 0, 2^{nd} group of SC satisfied with $\lambda = 0$.
 - if x = 1, 1^{st} group of SC satisfied with $\mu = 0$.
 - if 0 < x < 1, both groups of SC satisfied with $\lambda = \mu = 0$.
- Then, we only need to analyze 3 cases:

$$-x = 0 \implies \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\} = -\mu \le 0$$

$$-x = 1 \implies \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\} = \lambda \ge 0$$

$$-0 < x < 1 \implies \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\} = 0$$

Case 1: $x = 0 \Rightarrow \tilde{W} = wR_f$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\} \le 0$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})\tilde{R}\right\} \le \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})R_f\right\}$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(wR_f)\tilde{R}\right\} \le \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(wR_f)R_f\right\}$$

$$u'(wR_f)\mathbb{E}\left\{\tilde{R}\right\} \le u'(wR_f)R_f$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{\tilde{R}\right\} \le R_f$$

Consumer does not invest in risky asset if its expected return is lower than the risk-free return.

Case 2:
$$x = 1 \Rightarrow \tilde{W} = w\tilde{R}$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\} \ge 0$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})\tilde{R}\right\} \ge \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})R_f\right\}$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(w\tilde{R})\tilde{R}\right\} \ge \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(w\tilde{R})R_f\right\}$$

$$R_f \le \frac{\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(w\tilde{R})\tilde{R}\right\}}{\mathbb{E}\left\{u'(w\tilde{R})\right\}}$$

Consumer does not invest in risk-free asset if its return is "too low". We need more details about the \tilde{R} process and utility u to determine what "too low" is.

Case 3: 0 < x < 1

$$0 = \mathbb{E}\left\{u'(\tilde{W})(\tilde{R} - R_f)\right\}$$
$$= \operatorname{Cov}\left[u'(\tilde{W}), \ \tilde{R} - R_f\right] + \mathbb{E}\left[u'(\tilde{W})\right] \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{R} - R_f\right]$$

Then

$$\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{R} - R_f = \frac{-\operatorname{Cov}\left[u'(\tilde{W}), \ \tilde{R}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\,u'(\tilde{W})} > 0$$

Example 2: "Investing" in "Tiempos"

- In "Tiempos" lottery, you pick one number out of 100, all of them with equal probability (1%) of winning.
- In winning state, your gross return is $\tilde{R} = 72$.
- In losing state, your gross return is $\tilde{R} = 0$.
- If you don't play, you keep your money $(R_f = 1)$.
- Expected return on lottery is

$$\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{R} = 0.99 \times 0 + 0.01 \times 72 = 0.7128 < 1 = R_f$$

• Therefore, a risk-averse consumer would never play "Tiempos".

3 Intertemporal consumption

Adding a time dimension

- So far we have only studied static choices.
- Life is full of intertemporal choices: Should I study for my test today or tomorrow? Should I save or should I consume now?
- We will present a simple model: the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Model of Consumption.

- Developed by Modigliani (Nobel winner 1985) and Friedman (Nobel winner 1976).
- Will allow us to address several key issues: effects of government programs including Social Security, government debts and deficits.

The model

- Representative household lives 2 periods.
- Utility function:

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$


- $-c_0$ is consumption in first (current) period of life,
- $-c_1$ is consumption in second (future) period of life,
- $-0 < \beta < 1$ measures household's degree of impatience.
- Preferences over c_0, c_1 satisfy monotonicity (u' > 0) and convexity (u'' < 0).

More on preferences

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$

- Consumption smoothing motive, partially offset by discounting.
- Assume c_0 and c_1 are normal: more income \Rightarrow more of both.
- Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution measures willingness to substitute consumption over time:

$$MRS_{c_0,c_1} = \frac{U_{c_0}(c_0,c_1)}{U_{c_1}(c_0,c_1)} = \frac{u'(c_0)}{\beta u'(c_1)}$$



Budget constraint I

- Abstract from labor/lesiure tradeoff.
- (Labor) income $y_t \ge 0$ in period t = 0, 1.
- Initial wealth $a_0 \ge 0$.
- Consumer can save part of income or initial wealth in the first period, or it can borrow against future income y_1 .
- Interest rate on both savings and on loans is equal to r. Gross interest rate $R \equiv 1 + r$
- Let $s_t = y_t c_t$ denote saving.
- Budget constraint in first period:

$$a_1 = R(a_0 + s_0)$$

• Budget constraint in second period:

$$a_2 = R(a_1 + s_1) = 0$$

Budget constraint (II)

• Combining both constraints:


$$R(a_0 + s_0) + s_1 = 0$$
 \Rightarrow $-s_0 - \frac{s_1}{R} = a_0$

• Substitute $s_t = y_t - c_t$

$$c_0 + \frac{c_1}{R} = y_0 + \frac{y_1}{R} + a_0 = H + a_0 \equiv W$$
 (PVBC)

- We have normalized the price of the consumption good in the first period to 1.
- Gross interest rate $R \equiv 1 + r$ is the relative price of consumption goods today to consumption goods tomorrow.
- Called the present value budget constraint (PVBC).

$$c_0 + \frac{c_1}{R} = W$$



The consumer's problem

$$\max_{c_0, c_1} \{ u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) \} \qquad \text{subject to } c_0 + \frac{c_1}{R} = W$$

• Form Lagrangian with multiplier $\lambda \geq 0$

$$\mathcal{L}(c_0, c_1, \lambda) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) + \lambda \left(W - c_0 - \frac{c_1}{R} \right)$$

• FOCs:

$$u'(c_0) = \lambda$$
$$\beta u'(c_1) = \frac{\lambda}{R}$$

• Combine to get


Euler equation
$$u'(c_0) = \beta R u'(c_1)$$

$$u'(c_0) = \beta R u'(c_1)$$

Consumer is a lender

(1+r)W (1+r)W c₁ c₂ y₀ w current consumption

Consumer is a borrower



Implications of the Euler equation

$$u'(c_0) = \beta R u'(c_1)$$

• Can also be written

$$MRS_{c_0,c_1} = 1 + r$$

• Recall that u is concave, so $u'' < 0 \Rightarrow u'(c)$ is decreasing. So if:

$$-\beta(1+r) > 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad u'(c_0) > u'(c_1) \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_0 < c_1$$

$$-\beta(1+r) < 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad u'(c_0) < u'(c_1) \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_0 > c_1$$

$$-\beta(1+r) = 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad u'(c_0) = u'(c_1) \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_0 = c_1$$

• Behavior of consumption over time depends on rate of time preference relative to interest rate.

• If equal, perfect consumption smoothing.

Example 3: Logarithmic utility

$u(c) = \ln(c)$

• Euler equation:

$$\frac{1}{c_0} = \frac{\beta R}{c_1} \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad c_1 = \beta R c_0$$

• Using the PVBC

$$c_0 = W - \frac{c_1}{R} = W - \beta c_0$$

• So that

$$c_{0} = \frac{1}{1+\beta}W \qquad s_{0} = \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left(\beta y_{0} - a_{0} - \frac{y_{1}}{R}\right)$$

$$c_{1} = \frac{\beta R}{1+\beta}W \qquad a_{1} = \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left[\beta R(y_{0} + a_{0}) - y_{1}\right]$$

• Value function:

$$V(W,r) = (1 + \beta) \ln W + \beta \ln R + \beta \ln \beta - (1 + \beta) \ln (1 + \beta)$$

• Increasing wealth W, regardless of source, increases consumer utility:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial W} = \frac{1+\beta}{W}$$

• Effect of a change in interest rate r depends on wealth composition, which in turn determines whether the consumer has positive or negative assets a_1 at the end of period 1:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial r} = \frac{1}{R^2 W} \left[\beta R(y_0 + a_0) - y_1 \right]$$
$$= \frac{1 + \beta}{R^2 W} a_1$$

Example 4: CRRA utility

• The logarithmic utility from last example is just a special case of the constant relative risk aversion(CRRA) utility, when $\sigma = 1$.

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$


• With CRRA utility, the Bellman equation becomes


$$c_0^{-\sigma} = \beta R c_1^{-\sigma} \qquad \Rightarrow \quad c_1 = (\beta R)^{1/\sigma} c_0$$

• Use budget constraint $c_0 + \frac{c_1}{R} = W$ to solve for c_0 and c_1 :


$$c_0 = \frac{R}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\sigma}} W \qquad c_1 = \frac{R(\beta R)^{1/\sigma}}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\sigma}} W$$

Increasing wealth





Increasing interest rate: borrower



3.1 Many goods, two time periods

The model

- A consumer lives two periods, and chooses among n+1 goods in each period: x_{it} for $i \in \{0,1,\ldots,n\}$ and $t \in \{0,1\}$.
- Utility function depends on 2n + 2 goods:

$$U = \frac{(\alpha_0 x_{00}^{\rho} + \dots + \alpha_n x_{n0}^{\rho})^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}}}{1-\gamma} + \beta \frac{(\alpha_0 x_{01}^{\rho} + \dots + \alpha_n x_{n1}^{\rho})^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}}}{1-\gamma}$$

• Let \mathbf{x}_t be the bundle of goods consumed at time t:

$$\mathbf{x}_t = [x_{0t}, x_{1t}, \dots, x_{nt}]$$

Constraints in nominal terms

- Consumer can save and borrow money at nominal interest rate i.
- The budget constraint says that the present value of all consumption purchases must equal the present value of nominal income Y_t :

$$\sum_{k=0}^{n} p_{k0} x_{k0} + \frac{1}{1+i} \sum_{k=0}^{n} p_{k1} x_{k1} = Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+i}$$

• Let $C_t = \sum_{k=0}^n p_{kt} x_{kt}$ be nominal consumption at time t.

• Budget constraint becomes

$$C_0 + \frac{C_1}{1+i} = Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+i} \equiv W$$

where W is nominal wealth.

Constraints in real terms

- Let $P_t = (\alpha_0^{\sigma} p_{0t}^{1-\sigma} + \dots + \alpha_n^{\sigma} p_{nt}^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$ be the price index at time t
- Notice that $\frac{P_1}{P_0(1+i)} = \frac{1+\pi}{1+i} = \frac{1}{1+r}$, where π is the inflation rate, and r the real interest rate.
- Divide budget constraint by price index P_0

$$\frac{C_0}{P_0} + \frac{P_1}{P_0(1+i)} \frac{C_1}{P_1} = \frac{Y_0}{P_0} + \frac{P_1}{P_0(1+i)} \frac{Y_1}{P_1} = \frac{W}{P_0}$$
$$c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r} = y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} = w$$

where c_t is real consumption, y_t is real income, and w is real wealth.

• Constraint says that present value of real (composite) consumption equals the present value of real income.

Solving the problem: 2 steps

- Let \tilde{U} denote CES function: $\tilde{U}(\mathbf{x}_t) = (\alpha_0 x_{0t}^{\rho} + \dots + \alpha_n x_{nt}^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$
- Utility becomes:

$$U = \frac{\tilde{U}(\mathbf{x}_0)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta \frac{\tilde{U}(\mathbf{x}_1)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

- Consumer has to choose 2n + 2 variables, subject to 1 budget constraint.
- To solve this problem, consumer makes decisions in two stages
 - *Intra-temporal stage*: Given all prices and the total amount to spend in each period, consumer chooses goods for each period separately.
 - Inter-temporal stage: Taking the intra-temporal solution as given, solve the inter-temporal problem:

Intra-temporal stage

- Given all prices and the total amount to spend in each period, consumer chooses goods for each period separately.
- Since intra-temporal preferences are CES, we know (from Example 4 in Lecture 7) that if consumer spends C_t dollars and price level is P_t , the optimal utility he can get is

$$\tilde{V}(C_t, P_t) \equiv \max_{\mathbf{x_t}} \tilde{U}(\mathbf{x}_t) = \frac{C_t}{P_t} = c_t$$

Inter-temporal stage

• Taking the intra-temporal solution as given, problem becomes:

$$\max_{c_0, c_1} \frac{c_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta \frac{c_1^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \qquad \text{s.t} \qquad c_0 + \frac{c_1}{R} = w$$

• But this is equivalent to what we solved in Example 4 in this lecture. Its solution is characterized by the *Euler equation*

$$c_0^{-\gamma} = \beta R c_1^{-\gamma} \quad \Rightarrow c_1 = (\beta R)^{1/\gamma} c_0$$

• Solution is

$$c_0 = \frac{R}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\gamma}} w \qquad c_1 = \frac{R(\beta R)^{1/\gamma}}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\gamma}} w$$

Marshallian demands for the goods

• Demands for each of the goods in then:

$$x_{kt} = \left(\frac{\alpha_k}{\frac{p_{kt}}{P_t}}\right) c_t$$
$$= \left(\frac{\alpha_k}{\frac{p_{kt}}{P_t}}\right) \frac{R(\beta R)^{t/\gamma}}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\gamma}} w$$

• Notice that demand for goods depends only on preference parameters (α_k) and real variables (wealth w, interest rates r, relative prices p_{kt}/P_t)

Modeling implications

- If utility is time-separable, we can split the problem of choosing n goods over T periods into T+1 problems:
 - decide how much to spend in each of the T periods (inter-temporal allocation); and
 - take each period budget and decide how to spend it into the n goods (intra-temporal allocation)
- If intra-temporal preference is CES, we can interpret the indirect utilities of the intra-temporal allocations as *real composite consumption good*.
- From now on, in our macro models we will analyze dynamic consumption behavior assuming that there exist such real composite consumption good.
- We will simply call it the consumption good.

4 Intertemporal consumption with uncertainty

Intertemporal consumption with uncertainty

- Representative consumer lives 2 periods.
- She can save and borrow at interest rate r.

- Her initial asset is a_0 .
- She doesn't leave any debt or inheritance $(a_2 = 0)$.
- Her income $y_t \ge 0$ in period t = 0, 1:
 - y_0 is known at time of deciding c_0 .
 - $-\tilde{y}_1$ is uncertain. It takes value y_{1s} with probability π_s , depending on the state of nature $s=1,\ldots,S$.
 - Notice that $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s = 1$.
- Her expected future income is then

$$\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{y}_1 = \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s y_{1s}$$

Budget constraint

• Budget constraints:

$$a_1 = R(a_0 + y_0 - c_0)$$

 $a_2 = R(a_1 + \tilde{y}_1 - \tilde{c}_1) = 0$

- a_0 and y_0 are certain (she already have them in her bank).
- c_0 and a_1 are certain (she nows what she is choosing now).
- c_1 is uncertain because she needs to adjust future consumption to income shocks:

$$\begin{split} \tilde{c}_1 &= a_1 + \tilde{y}_1 \quad \Rightarrow \\ \mathbb{E} \, \tilde{c}_1 &= a_1 + \mathbb{E} \, \tilde{y}_1 \quad \Rightarrow \\ \tilde{c}_1 &= \mathbb{E} \, \tilde{c}_1 + \underbrace{\tilde{y}_1 - \mathbb{E} \, \tilde{y}_1}_{\text{forecast error}} \end{split}$$

Consumption plans, contingent on income

State	${\mathbb P}$	Period 0	Period 1
s	π_s	$c_0 = a_0 + y_0 - \frac{a_1}{R}$	$c_{1s} = a_1 + y_{1s}$

Example 5: Only two states of nature

State	Probability	Period 0	Period 1
L	π_L	$c_0 = a_0 + y_0 - \frac{a_1}{R}$	$c_1^L = a_1 + y_1^L$
H	π_H	$c_0 = a_0 + y_0 - \frac{a_1}{R}$	$c_1^H = a_1 + y_1^H$

Consumer wants to maximize her discounted expected utility:

$$U(c_0, c_1^L, c_1^H, \pi_L, \pi_H) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{y}_2} [u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)]$$

$$= \pi_L [u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1^L)] + \pi_H [u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1^H)]$$

$$= (\pi_L + \pi_H)u(c_0) + \beta [\pi_L u(c_1^L) + \pi_H u(c_1^H)]$$

$$= u(c_0) + \beta \mathbb{E} u(c_1)$$

$$U = \{u(c_0) + \beta \mathbb{E} u(c_1)\}$$

$$= \{u(c_0) + \beta \left[\pi_L u(c_1^L) + \pi_H u(c_1^H)\right]\}$$

$$= \{u\left(a_0 + y_0 - \frac{a_1}{R}\right) + \beta \left[\pi_L u\left(a_1 + y_1^L\right) + \pi_H u\left(a_1 + y_1^H\right)\right]\}$$

Objective now depends on a_1 alone. Take FOC:

$$0 = -\frac{1}{R}u'(c_0) + \beta \pi_L u'(c_1^L) + \beta \pi_H u'(c_1^H)$$

$$u'(c_0) = \beta R \left[\pi_L u'(c_1^L) + \pi_H u'(c_1^H)\right]$$

$$= \beta R \mathbb{E} \left[u'(c_1)\right] \qquad (Euler equation)$$

Wealth and permanent income

• Combining the budget constraints she gets

$$c_0 + \frac{\tilde{c}_1}{R} = \underbrace{a_0 + y_0 + \frac{\tilde{y}_1}{R}}_{\text{wealth } \tilde{W}_0}$$
 (for any possible state of nature)

• Her wealth at time 0 is uncertain because future income is random. But she can form an expectation:

$$c_0 + \frac{\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{c}_1}{R} = a_0 + y_0 + \frac{\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{y}_1}{R} = \mathbb{E}\,\tilde{W}_0$$

• Her permanent income y_p is the constant level of consumption that she expects to be able to afford, given her expected wealth. Then

$$y_p = \frac{R}{1+R} \, \mathbb{E} \, \tilde{W}$$

The consumer's problem

• She wants to maximize her discounted expected utility (von Neumann-Morgenstern):

$$U\left(c_{0}, \{c_{1s}; \pi_{s}\}_{s=1}^{S}\right) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{y}_{2}}\left[u(c_{0}) + \beta u(c_{1})\right]$$
$$= u(c_{0}) + \beta \mathbb{E} u(c_{1})$$

• subject to contingent plans

$$c_0 + \frac{c_{1s}}{R} = a_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_{1s}}{R} \equiv W_s$$
 (for $s = 1, \dots, S$)

- There are S constraints (one per state of nature).
- Let $\lambda_s \pi_s$ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the s^{th} constraint.

Solving the problem

• The Lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = u(c_0) + \beta \mathbb{E} u(c_1) + \sum_s \lambda_s \pi_s \left(W_s - c_0 - \frac{c_{1s}}{R} \right)$$
$$= u(c_0) + \sum_s \pi_s \left[\beta u(c_{1s}) + \lambda_s \left(W_s - c_0 - \frac{c_{1s}}{R} \right) \right]$$

• FOCs:

$$(\text{wrt } c_0) \qquad 0 = u'(c_0) - \sum_s \pi_s \lambda_s \qquad \Rightarrow \quad u'(c_0) = \mathbb{E} \lambda$$

$$(\text{wrt } c_{1s}) \qquad 0 = \pi_s \left[\beta u'(c_{1s}) - \frac{\lambda_s}{R} \right] \qquad \Rightarrow \quad \pi_s \beta R u'(c_{1s}) = \pi_s \lambda_s$$

The Euler equation

• Adding up the FOCs wrt c_{1s} , we get

$$\sum_{s} \pi_{s} \beta R u'(c_{1s}) = \sum_{s} \pi_{s} \lambda_{s}$$
$$\beta R \mathbb{E} u'(c_{1}) = \mathbb{E} \lambda$$

• Substituting $\mathbb{E} \lambda$ from the first FOC to get

Euler equation

$$u'(c_0) = \beta R \mathbb{E} u'(c_1)$$

Side note: Some math worth remembering

- Let u and v be functions, X and Z random variables, and a and b scalars.
- Suppose that X and Z depend on parameter t.
- Then, under fairly general conditions:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[au(X) + bv(Z)\right] = a\,\mathbb{E}\,u(X) + b\,\mathbb{E}\,v(Z)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E} u(X)}{\partial t} = \mathbb{E} \left[u'(X) \frac{\partial X}{\partial t} \right]$$

A faster way to get the Euler equation

• Instead of having one constraint for each state of nature, just write one: the expected values of the constraint:

$$c_0 + \frac{\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{c}_1}{R} = \mathbb{E}\,\tilde{W}_0$$

- Just keep in mind that this is a shortcut: the budget constraint must be satisfied in every state of nature, not only in expected values.
- Besides, the consumer is choosing future consumption contingent on each state of nature. She is not just choosing her expected future consumption.

Solving the problem

• Lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = u'(c_0) + \beta \mathbb{E} u(c_1) + \lambda \left(\mathbb{E} \tilde{W} - c_0 - \frac{\mathbb{E} c_1}{R} \right)$$

• FOCs

(wrt
$$c_0$$
) $0 = u'(c_0) - \lambda$ $\Rightarrow u'(c_0) = \lambda$
(wrt c_1) $0 = \beta \mathbb{E} u'(c_1) - \frac{\lambda}{R}$ $\Rightarrow \beta R \mathbb{E} u'(c_1) = \lambda$

Euler equation, again

• Then, from the two FOCs

$$u'(c_0) = \beta R \mathbb{E} u'(c_1)$$
 (Euler equation)

• Euler equation can be written as:

$$\frac{u'(c_0)}{\beta \mathbb{E} u'(c_1)} = R$$

MRS of present consumption for future consumption price of present consumption in terms of future consumption

Example 6: Hall

- Assume that utility is quadratic $u(c) = \alpha c 0.5c^2$ and that $\beta R = 1$.
- Euler equation is:

$$\mathbb{E} c_1 = c_0$$

- This means that consumption would follow a random walk.
- In such case, under the pure life cycle-permanent income hypothesis, a forecast of future consumption obtained by extrapolating today's level by the historical trend is impossible to improve.

Example 7: CRRA utility, with uncertainty

- Now assume that consumer has constant relative risk aversion: $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$, with $\sigma > 0$.
- Euler equation is:

$$c_0^{-\sigma} = \beta R \mathbb{E} \left(c_1^{-\sigma} \right)$$

• But notice that $\mathbb{E}\left(c_1^{-\sigma}\right) \neq (\mathbb{E}\,c_1)^{-\sigma}$, so we can not simply use budget constraint

$$c_0 + \frac{\mathbb{E}\,\tilde{c}_1}{R} = \mathbb{E}\,\tilde{W}_0$$

to solve for c_0 and $\mathbb{E} c_1$.

• So, in dynamic models with uncertainty, it is often necessary to use numerical methods to analyze the solution of the model.

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